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There is a spectre haunting post-Kantian philosophy – the spectre of its possibility. Kant’s inquiry into the 
‘transcendental’ conditions of the possibility of knowledge left lingering questions as to how inquiry into 
such conditions could be possible, what the subject matter of such an inquiry would be, and, indeed, whether 
there are transcendental conditions in Kant’s sense – universal, necessary, and a priori conditions of 
knowledge – at all. 
Kant’s reception is marked by an immediate response pressing him on precisely these points, 
among them Reinhold’s sympathetic attempts to provide a first principle justifying Kant’s claims about our 
cognitive faculties,1 and Schulze’s skeptical doubts that any such attempts at justification could succeed.2 
German Idealism is born in Fichte’s attempt to answer these questions in the form of a self-grounding 
‘science of knowledge’, a foundational ‘science of science’ which need not suppose anything prior to itself, 
beginning as it does with a supposedly absolute first principle, the act of the self-positing I.3 Not long after 
the publication of the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, Hamann gives us a label for the problem 
of accounting for the possibility of critical philosophy itself, calling it ‘metacritique’.4 
Early 20th century debates over the possibility of ‘metaphysics’ are direct descendants of the debate 
over metacritique, and share a family resemblance with those debates that is grounded in a set of questions 
and answers whose central themes are already delineated in Kant’s critical philosophy. Wittgenstein and 
Carnap are sympathetic to Kant’s dismissal of transcendent metaphysics, but skeptical that there could be 
any substantive account of the fundamental conditions of our meaning-making. By contrast, Heidegger 
follows Fichte and the early German Romantics in seeing answers to the problems raised by metacritique 
not in science, but in the non-discursive forms of understanding and expression exemplified in art. As we 
shall see, this Romantic turn to art is not taken arbitrarily; it is motivated by methodological considerations 
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that emerge within Kant’s own critical system. Today, the fate and the legacy of critical philosophy as a 
whole turns on our answers to these questions. 
I take up the Kantian considerations which lead to an understanding of art as a window into the 
fundamental conditions of meaning-making in section 2, before turning to Heidegger’s development of this 
line of thought in section 3. In section 4, I examine Carnap and Wittgenstein’s skepticism concerning the 
meaning of Heidegger’s philosophical terminology, focusing on what is perhaps the most problematic case: 
Heidegger’s talk of ‘the nothing’. I argue that this skepticism is overblown. Heidegger’s talk of the nothing 
is meaningful in the way that talk about figure and ground is meaningful: it serves as an ostensive indication 
of intersubjectively accessible structural features of our encounters with things. I conclude, in section 5, by 
drawing out the existential ramifications of the decision to speak or be silent about these fundamental 
conditions, drawing on Audre Lorde to illustrate the place of art (and in particular, poetry) in making it 
possible for us to lead authentic lives. 
 Let us return to the Kantian beginning, however, to see why talking about the fundamental 
conditions of our understanding might require us to look beyond the limits of ordinary discursive 
intelligibility. 
 
2. Judgment, genius, and art 
For Kant, the understanding is “the faculty of rules”,5 the capacity to think in rule-governed ways, which is 
to say, according to concepts. Since our cognition depends on sensible intuitions, while also requiring 
concepts provided by the understanding in order to constitute judgments, Kant labels all human cognition, 
in virtue of this necessary conceptuality, ‘discursive’.6 To be able to think according a rule does not mean 
that one is able to apply it, however, and Kant distinguishes the capacity to think in rule-governed ways 
from the power of judgment, which “is the faculty of subsuming under rules.”7 
Kant argues that the power to judge cannot itself be reduced to a set of rules on pain of a regress: 
the application of a rule requires knowledge of when the rule properly applies; of what is covered by the 
rule and what is not. This knowledge cannot itself be a rule, for then we would need another rule in order 
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to know when that rule applied, and so on ad infinitum.8 Kant concludes that “although the understanding 
is certainly capable of being instructed and equipped through rules, the power of judgment is a special talent 
that cannot be taught but only practiced.”9 Kant identifies this dimension of judgment with what he calls 
‘mother-wit’, 
the lack of which cannot be made good by any school; for, although such a school can 
provide a limited understanding with plenty of rules […] nevertheless the faculty for 
making use of them correctly must belong to the student himself, and in the absence of 
such a natural gift no rule that one might prescribe to him for this aim is safe from misuse.10 
 
Kant observes that a doctor or a judge might understand explicit formulations of medical or legal principles 
in the abstract, while being unable to intelligently apply those principles when confronted with a concrete 
medical or legal case. Such a person understands, but they are lacking in judgment. This, Kant explains, is 
“the sole and great utility of examples: that they sharpen the power of judgment”11 by tutoring us in how to 
apply concepts to cases, and thus, “examples are the leading-strings of the power of judgment, which he 
who lacks the natural talent for judgment can never do without.”12 The power of judgment, then, enables 
us to follow rules without itself being constituted by rules, and good judgment is more than the ability to 
think abstractly using concepts: it is the ability to correctly apply concepts to concrete cases. 
The non-discursive guidance provided to the understanding by exemplary cases shows up again in 
the Critique of the Power of Judgment, in Kant’s discussion of art and artistic genius. Art provides non-
discursive guidance to the understanding by stimulating the imagination to produce representations that 
Kant calls ‘aesthetic ideas’. An aesthetic idea “occasions much thinking though without it being possible 
for any determinate thought, i.e., concept, to be adequate to it”, and as a result, “no language fully attains 
or can make intelligible”13 what is contained in such an idea. The artist possesses ‘genius’ in the specific 
sense of a natural ability to produce aesthetic ideas in their imagination, and to use their understanding to 
give “the rule to art”14 in the creation of works capable of communicating aesthetic ideas to others. The 
artwork is organized by a rule, even though the content of this rule is not something that we can make fully 
explicit in words. Kant gives the following example of an aesthetic idea, and explains their use for 
cognition: 
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Jupiter’s eagle, with the lightning in its claws, is an attribute of the powerful king of heaven, 
as is the peacock of the splendid queen of heaven. They do not, like logical attributes, 
represent what lies in our concepts of the sublimity and majesty of creation, but something 
else, which gives the imagination cause to spread itself over a multitude of related 
representations, which let one think more than one can express in a concept determined by 
words; and they yield an aesthetic idea, which serves that idea of reason instead of logical 
presentation, although really only to animate the mind by opening up for it the prospect of 
an immeasurable field of related representations.15 
 
Art expands our thinking by means of imaginative representations that cannot be summarized by means of 
determinate concepts. By stimulating thought, in a piecemeal way, towards representation of “an 
immeasurable field of related representations,” aesthetic ideas serve to indicate, without exhausting, the 
dimension and extent of the space of meaning, providing a non-logical indication of the infinite breadth of 
possible experience. The aesthetic ideas conveyed by artworks make us strive to think the unthinkable 
totality of this space, and can serve to point us towards ideas of reason that “in a fundamental and unnoticed 
way, serve the understanding as a canon”,16 thereby constituting the skeletal form of the space of meaning 
which finite cognition will imperfectly flesh out. 
 In his essay, “Concerning the Concept of the Wissenschaftslehre” Fichte raises the question of what 
is involved in producing an a priori “science of knowledge” (Wissenschaftslehre) and suggests that genius, 
in Kant’s sense, is as much a requirement for the philosopher as for the artist: “the philosopher requires an 
obscure feeling for what is right, or genius, to no less an extent than does, for instance, the poet or the 
artist.”17 This is somewhat surprising, given that in the third Critique, Kant is clear that “what is called 
genius […] is a talent for art, not for science.”18 Fichte, however, provides an argument for this extension 
of genius to the philosopher based on Kant’s regress argument concerning rule-following. Fichte writes: 
I am not quite sure how and why, but an otherwise admirable philosophical author [viz., 
Maimon] has become a bit agitated over the innocent assertion contained in the foregoing 
note. “One would,” he says [quoting Maimon], “prefer to leave the empty word ‘genius’ to 
tightrope walkers, French cooks, ‘beautiful souls,’ artists, and others. For sound sciences 
it would be better to advance a theory of discovery.” One should indeed advance such a 
theory, which will certainly happen as soon as science has reached the point where it is 
possible to discover such a theory. But where is the contradiction between such a project 
and the assertion made above? And how will we discover such a theory of discovery? By 
means, perhaps, of a theory of the discovery of a theory of discovery? And this?19 
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Fichte’s point is that to demand that philosophy begin from a ‘theory of discovery’ in laying out its most 
fundamental principles would lead to a regress with the same structure as the rule-following paradox at the 
heart of judgment. Just as the rule-following that constitutes a judgment must be based on something that 
is not itself a rule on pain of an infinite regress of rules for following rules, the fundamental principles of a 
science of knowledge would have to be discoverable without guidance from an explicit theory of discovery, 
on pain of an infinite regress of ever-deeper theories of discovery. Fichte concludes that at this most 
fundamental level of explanation, the philosopher needs genius in order to uncover and communicate the 
science of knowledge, since knowledge of its fundamental principles cannot be generated according to any 
explicit theory or rule. 
Kant had already suggested that art could be revelatory of the deep structure of the space of 
meaning; Fichte takes a step further in suggesting that the philosopher needs something akin to the artist’s 
ability to distill non-discursive insights into artworks in order to communicate their understanding of what 
we do at the most fundamental level in making sense of the world.20 This has wide-reaching consequences 
for critical philosophy: it implies that the critique of our sense-making powers requires us to reach beyond 
the limits of the discursively-articulable conceptual order in order to explicate the most fundamental 
grounds of the discursively-articulable conceptual order. As we shall see, this Kantian background allows 
us to better see the meaning behind Heidegger’s talk of ‘the nothing’: this talk serves to indicate a 
fundamental condition of encountering worldly things, and it must do this in a way that goes beyond our 
ordinary concepts because that condition’s fundamentality implies that it cannot be described in the usual 
way, that is, conceptually, by a set of marks. 
 
3. A Big Nothing? 
In “What is Metaphysics?” Heidegger notes that “The relation to the world that pervades all sciences 
[Wissenschaften] as such lets them seek beings themselves.”21 In relating to the world in the way that we 
do in the sciences, beings become available to us such that we can “make them objects of investigation” 
and “determine their grounds.”22 How is this possible? In talk that delimits what is talked about in the 
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sciences, Heidegger notes that we often use a term, ‘nothing’, that puts the beings with which science is 
concerned in contrast with what they are not: 
[P]recisely in the way scientific man secures to himself what is most properly his, he 
speaks, whether explicitly or not, of something different. What should be examined are 
beings only, and besides that – nothing; beings alone, and further – nothing; solely beings, 
and beyond that – nothing. 
 What about this nothing? Is it an accident that we talk this way so automatically? 
Is it only a manner of speaking – and nothing besides?23 
 
Heidegger himself raises the fairly obvious worry that asking after this nothing fallaciously transposes 
nothing into a something, into a being: 
In our asking we posit the nothing in advance as something that ‘is’ such and such; we 
posit it as a being. But that is exactly what it is distinguished from. Interrogating the nothing 
– asking what and how it, the nothing, is – turns what is interrogated into its opposite. The 
question deprives itself of its own object. 
Accordingly, every answer to this question is also impossible from the start. For it 
necessarily assumes the form: the nothing “is” this or that. With regard to the nothing, 
question and answer alike are inherently absurd.24 
 
To make what is not into something that is would be a terrible mistake, but for Heidegger, the nothing is 
not to be understood negatively as the absence of beings; the nothing is to be understood positively as an 
aspect of their being. Heidegger writes, “We can of course think the whole of beings in an ‘idea,’ then 
negate what we have imagined in our thought, and thus ‘think’ it negated. In this way we do attain the 
formal concept of the imagined nothing but never the nothing itself.”25 Logical cognition yields a formal 
concept of non-being as the negation of all existence, but Heidegger argues that this non-being is not the 
nothing that makes possible the relation to the world at work in the sciences. Rather, the nothing is what 
first places us in relation to “the whole of beings” upon which logical cognition subsequently operates in 
generating the negative concept of non-being. Heidegger explains that the negative concept will not do for 
his purposes because for beings like us, “the nothing makes possible the manifestness of beings as such. 
The nothing does not merely serve as the counterconcept of beings; rather, it originally belongs to their 
essential unfolding as such.”26 In his 1943 “Postscript to ‘What is Metaphysics?’” he writes that 
Unlike beings, being cannot be represented or brought forth in the manner of an object. As 
that which is altogether other than all beings, being is that which is not. But this nothing 
essentially prevails as being. We too quickly abdicate thinking when, in a facile 
explanation, we pass off the nothing as a mere nullity and equate it with the unreal. [… 
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W]e must prepare ourselves solely in readiness to experience in the nothing the pervasive 
expanse of that which gives every being the warrant to be. That is being itself.27 
 
This leaves us with a methodological question paralleling Hamann’s metacritical question about the 
possibility of Kant’s critical philosophy: given that the nothing “cannot be represented or brought forth in 
the manner of an object,” how can we speak about it?  What enables us to begin thinking about the nothing? 
And what does Heidegger mean when he says that the nothing “prevails as being”? To answer these 
questions, we will need to examine Heidegger’s account of the relationship between anxiety and the 
nothing. 
Heidegger suggests that fundamental ‘attunements’ (Befindlichkeiten) such as existential anxiety 
(Angst) can reveal the structure of our relatedness to ‘beings as a whole.’ We are always ‘attuned’ in some 
way, which is to say that we always find ourselves in some condition or other, and, by being in this 
condition, find ourselves related to beings. An attunement is a way of finding oneself already related to 
beings, of finding oneself, in other words, in a world. Heidegger writes that “being attuned, in which we 
‘are’ one way or another, […] lets us find ourselves among beings as a whole.”28 Attunements are an 
essential and inescapable aspect of the way in which we exist. In Heidegger’s terms, they are fundamental 
ontological determinations of our being, because they pertain to our way of being; they determine our 
‘being-there’ (Dasein) such that we are what we are by being ready in our attunements for encounters with 
beings.29 
Heidegger distinguishes the readiness of attunement from what he calls ‘understanding’, and from 
articulations of our understanding through ‘interpretation’. Understanding is also a fundamental ontological 
determination of our way of being, involving a tacit grasp of yourself as having certain existential 
possibilities. Understanding is always a tacit self-understanding because it involves the determination of 
your own possibilities for being. Interpretation consists in an understanding of ways you might be such that 
beings show up in ways that are defined by those possibilities: nails show up for the carpenter, for example, 
as beings bearing a certain significance. All understanding and interpretation, however, depends on our 
being attuned, our being ready for encounters with beings in the first place. An attunement is a readiness 
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for other beings that makes possible the projection of possibilities wherein beings can stand out as 
understood, and stand out in particular ways, as interpreted. An attunement is therefore not a cognitive 
relation to beings, involving a determinate interpretation of what and how those beings are; rather, it makes 
such relations possible. 
Crucially, attunements are also not to be understood as psychological states. While an attunement 
is how you find yourself, it is not an encounter with yourself qua psychological entity. Attunements first 
enable us to be related to things in the world, including our own psychological states and attitudes, by first 
placing us in the world, such that particular beings can manifest particular characters and valences.30 Being 
attuned is a way of finding yourself that is more basic than encountering yourself in an intentionally-directed 
emotional state such as fear or worry. To encounter yourself in a specific emotional state is already to 
understand yourself as a particular kind of being in a particular kind of state. So, whereas worry or fear are 
already expressions of a more or less determinate understanding of yourself – an understanding of yourself 
as related in some way to the things you worry about or fear – anxiety, as an attunement, is not itself a 
relation between you and a specific being about which you are anxious. As Heidegger puts it, “What anxiety 
is about is completely indefinite,”31 and “what anxiety is about is the world as such.”32  
 This makes anxiety special in its ability to reveal to us the way that we are connected with ‘beings 
as a whole’, tied up with a network of beings related to us and to each other; it can reveal how, in other 
words, we are entangled with the world. As Michael Inwood explains, 
Explicit Angst [i.e., anxiety] reveals the world as such, and it does this because in some 
way or other beings within the world are negated, whether by slipping away, or by losing 
their significance and sinking into indifference. Correlative with the bare world, Angst 
reveals bare Dasein, not Dasein as a postman or Dasein as a philosopher, but Dasein 
stripped of its customary identity and its familiar moorings in intraworldly things.33 
 
Anxiety reveals the locus of our possible relations to beings through a jarring contrast: the dense tangle of 
meanings that typically weaves together an ordinary life is noticeably thinned out. In anxiety we undergo a 
limit case of our being-in-the-world amidst things: we exist amidst things, but in such a way that their 
significance for us is maximally attenuated. You are there, but not as an existential agent defined by your 
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possible projects, and the beings are there, but inertly, and devoid of meaning.34 Connecting this back to 
‘the nothing’ of “What is Metaphysics?” Heidegger writes, 
In the clear night of the nothing of anxiety the original openness of beings as such arises: 
that they are beings – and not nothing. But this ‘and not nothing’ we add in our talk is not 
some kind of appended clarification. Rather it makes possible in advance the manifestness 
of beings in general. The essence of the originally noth-ing nothing lies in this, that it brings 
Dasein for the first time before beings as such.35 
 
According to Heidegger, anxiety has the power to reveal that there is something rather than nothing because 
of the nothing, because the ‘openness of beings’ opened by our attunements is always ready to reveal beings 
as distinct from nothing. The structure of this openness, that beings are something ‘and not nothing’ is, 
therefore, revealed in fundamental attunements like anxiety: 
The nothing unveils itself in anxiety – but not as a being. Just as little is it given as an 
object. Anxiety is no kind of grasping of the nothing. All the same, the nothing becomes 
manifest in and through anxiety, although, to repeat, not in such a way that the nothing 
becomes manifest in our uncanniness quite “apart from” beings as a whole.36 
 
Heidegger’s nothing is an essential dimension of what allows beings to be understood as beings, but it is 
not itself a being. It is not a ‘Big Nothing’, just as being is not itself a ‘Big Being’.37 The nothing is manifest 
in any understanding that things are, but not as an independently subsisting “Big Nothing,” a distinct being, 
that we could represent as an empirical object, or grasp through a logical form. It is in this sense, then, that 
the “nothing essentially prevails as being.”38 
Heidegger’s infamous claim that “The nothing itself noths” (Das Nichts selbst nichtet)39 is meant 
to indicate it is not a specific being, not our cognition, nor even ‘beings as a whole’ that make possible the 
manifest difference between being and non-being. In our ‘being-there’ as Dasein we find the nothing 
differentiating itself from beings. The nothing distinguishes itself from beings in the ordinary, everyday 
manifestation of beings as what they are. In anxiety, because our preoccupation with beings and what they 
can do for us is suspended, this fundamental structure of differentiation is freed for our attention, and the 
noth-ing (nichten) of the nothing (das Nichts) can be thematized phenomenologically. Send not to know 
for whom the nothing noths; it noths for thee. 
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Heidegger ties the noth-ing of the nothing to our transcendence, our way of being amidst other 
beings. In being amidst other beings we are not simply related to them as a table is related to what lies on 
top of it, we are related to the being of those beings, in the sense that our being amidst other beings is always 
an understanding of their ways of being, an interpretation of them as being some way. Heidegger writes that 
“If in the ground of its essence Dasein were not transcending, which now means, if it were not in advance 
holding itself out into the nothing, then it could never adopt a stance toward beings nor even toward itself.”40 
To be Dasein is to be ready to recognize beings as distinct from the nothing. The capacity to witness beings 
standing out from the nothing constitutes our ‘being-there’ as an essentially relational ‘being-in-the-world’ 
– a being that is related to a world of beings precisely though understanding the ways that beings can be. 
This understanding is what allows Dasein to ‘transcend itself’ in the sense of ‘reaching beyond itself’. 
Dasein’s transcendence is, in part, its recognition of the being of beings – that they are and how they are – 
and this is the recognition that they are something and not nothing. 
The nothing is an essential part of Heidegger’s answer to the question, ‘what is metaphysics?’ 
Heidegger’s nothing is both the origin of metaphysical inquiry, and the answer to what Heidegger sees as 
the most fundamental question of metaphysics, why there is something rather than nothing. As such, 
Heidegger writes that 
Only because the nothing is manifest in the ground of Dasein can the total strangeness of 
beings overwhelm us. Only when the strangeness of beings oppresses us does it arouse and 
evoke wonder. Only on the ground of wonder – the manifestness of the nothing – does the 
‘why?’ loom before us. Only because the ‘why’ is possible as such can we in a definite 
way inquire into grounds and ground things.41 
 
Heidegger argues that the noth-ing of the nothing is a structural feature of our every encounter with beings, 
a fundamental condition of their meaning anything to us. The noth-ing of the nothing is the condition of 
our being amidst beings, and therefore, of any access to ‘beings as a whole’. 
For this reason, the nothing is essential to the delimitation of the subject matter of the sciences, and 
indeed, to their very possibility. All sciences study beings, and this includes the science of metaphysics 
which inquires into the being of things insofar as they are beings (τό ὄν ᾗ ὄν). Heidegger’s point is that the 
wholeness of ‘beings as a whole’ – the unity of the meaning of being, and the unity of the world to which 
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all the beings belong and to which we belong as ‘being-in-the-world’ – is made possible by something that 
is not itself a being: the nothing which differentiates itself from beings in our every encounter with them. 
The manifestness of the nothing in anxiety is the manifestation of that which metaphysics asks after when 
it reaches beyond ‘beings as a whole’ to ask why they are, i.e., why there is something rather than nothing. 
There is something rather than nothing because of the noth-ing of the nothing, and this means that we can 
ask ‘why’ questions about beings, including the ‘why’ questions that animate metaphysics, only because of 
‘something’ which is not a being: the noth-ing of the nothing, a nothing which is not a Big Nothing. 
Heidegger suggests here that the strangeness of this answer to the most fundamental question of 
metaphysics – that nothing explains why there is something rather than nothing – is the true origin of the 
wonder that, according to Plato, is the beginning of philosophy,42 and, in making possible our sense that 
anything exists at all, the nothing is among the fundamental grounds of meaning. 
 
4. Carnap and Wittgenstein: is talk about the nothing meaningless? 
I now want to examine some worries for Heidegger’s view that center on the idea that what he says is 
meaningless; that there is something inescapably defective about his attempts to talk about the nothing, 
such that the ontology ostensibly on offer above, is, in fact, nonsense. In what is probably the most well-
known expression of this kind of worry, Carnap argues in “The Elimination of Metaphysics Through 
Logical Analysis of Language” that statements about being and nothing are ‘pseudo-statements’. Speaking 
about metaphysics more generally, Carnap writes that “Metaphysics is not ‘superstition’; it is possible to 
believe true and false propositions, but not to believe meaningless sequences of words.”43 For Carnap, the 
statements of metaphysics are meaningless because they do not express genuine propositions. Carnap thinks 
this can be demonstrated in two ways: first, through logical analysis, which reveals that many metaphysical 
statements are inexpressible in the predicate calculus as well-formed propositions, and second, through the 
observation that the statements that remain after we set aside the illogical ones lack humanly-applicable 
conditions of verification. 
 
Suarez – “Art, Authenticity, and Understanding” (DRAFT 21-Aug-3) – 12 
Here, in response, we should grant right away that the nothing is not, illogically, also a something. 
Carnap is right that grammatical appearances notwithstanding, no object need correspond to a negated 
existentially-quantified proposition.44 But Heidegger is explicit in distinguishing the nothing he is speaking 
of from the non-being expressed by such a proposition. Next, although Heidegger’s nothing is not an object, 
not even a logical object, Heidegger does give a positive account of how the nothing can be manifest such 
that we are in a position to evaluate statements about it. While Heidegger’s statements about the nothing 
are not empirically verifiable, they are evaluable based on phenomena that are manifest when we are in the 
attunement of anxiety. Talk about the nothing functions in the same way that talk about the difference 
between figure and ground does—it serves to indicate a structure belonging to our being-in-the-world about 
which we can make accurate or inaccurate claims.45 This allows us to understand the ‘the’ in ‘the nothing’ 
in a deflationary way: it doesn’t define a unique item present in experience, but a structure which can be 
reidentified and distinguished from others—just like the difference between figure and ground.46 
Carnap, of course, thinks that he understands what Heidegger and the metaphysicians are really up 
to. Underlying their (supposed) confusion of the merely grammatical with the actually meaningful is their 
confusion of the “expression of the general attitude of a person towards life”47 with genuine fact-stating 
discourse: “The metaphysician believes he travels in territory in which truth and falsehood are at stake. In 
reality, however, he has not asserted anything, but only expressed something, like an artist.”48 Carnap 
concludes famously that “Metaphysicians are musicians without musical ability”49, and while Carnap is 
certainly not recommending that we commit art to the flames, he is recommending that we exclude 
metaphysics from philosophy on the grounds that it is art, and as such expressive of feeling rather than 
anything which could be true or false.50 
Is Heidegger guilty of attempting compositions best left to Beethoven? Carnap speculates that in 
Heidegger’s discussion of anxiety and the nothing, “the word ‘nothing’ seems to refer to a certain emotional 
constitution, possibly of a religious sort, or something or other that underlies such emotions”51. Here Carnap 
is partially right: ‘the nothing’ refers to ‘something or other’ that underlies our emotions, something or 
other that is manifest in the attunement of anxiety. For Heidegger, however, this ‘something or other’ is not 
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an entity, and certainly not a creature of human psychology. As noted earlier, Heidegger’s concept of 
attunement is not the concept of a psychological state, and the nothing is not a being. 
Granting for the moment that Heidegger is doing something more than expressing his feelings in 
pseudo-scientific form, there remain more subtle worries regarding the very possibility of meaning in our 
attempts to speak about the most fundamental conditions of meaning. Does Heidegger’s work constitute an 
attempt to say what can only be shown? In his turn to poetry, and the elaborate contortions of ‘beyng,’ 
‘being’, and so on, was Heidegger trying to ‘whistle it?’52 The problem here would be, as Frank Ramsey 
joked, that “what we can’t say we can’t say, and we can’t whistle it either.”53 
Here we can turn from Carnap’s direct criticism of Heidegger to Wittgenstein’s suggestion in the 
Tractatus, and elsewhere, that statements about the grounds of meaning are, strictly speaking, meaningless. 
Wittgenstein writes in the Preface to the Tractatus that “The whole sense of the book might be summed up 
in the following words: what can be said at all can be said clearly, and what we cannot talk about we must 
pass over in silence.”54 The book is an attempt “to draw a limit […] to the expression of thoughts”, and it 
will draw this limit within language, since it is only “in language that the limit can be drawn.”55 In language, 
there are examples of both sense and nonsense to be found, allowing us to see where the boundary lies 
between the one and the other. In thought, by contrast, although there is a limit to sense, there is no boundary 
to mark between sense and nonsense. If we assume that all thought has sense, then what lacks sense will be 
unthinkable, and, since we cannot think the unthinkable, there are no ‘nonsense thoughts’ to separate from 
‘genuine thoughts’ – those with sense. To draw a boundary between sense and nonsense in thought, then, 
“we should have to find both sides of the limit thinkable […, that is] we should have to be able to think 
what cannot be thought.”56 
Notoriously, the Tractatus appears to present an account of sense according to which its own 
propositions are nonsense. Meaningful speech concerns facts: to speak meaningfully is at minimum to say 
something about how the world could be; to say how it must be, is to have said nothing at all. So insofar as 
the Tractatus purports to say what are the necessary features of thought, meaningful language, the world, 
and subjects’ perspectives, its propositions fail to say anything. Worse yet, many of its statements cannot 
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even be construed as limit cases of meaning – that is, as tautologies or contradictions – since many of the 
necessities in question are supposed to be non-logical. 
So, if the Tractatus itself is largely filled with nonsense, what is its purpose? As Wittgenstein puts 
it in the penultimate section of the Tractatus, “My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: 
anyone who understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has used them—as steps—
to climb up beyond them.”57 In reading the Tractatus, what seems, at first, to make sense reverses itself, 
reveals itself as nonsense, and returns us to the tacit grasp of the division between sense and nonsense that 
we already possessed, wordlessly, and all along, in our everyday making sense of things. Wittgenstein’s 
book guides us back to a recognition of the limits of intelligibility without ever succeeding in saying what 
it wants to – and indeed, if we take Wittgenstein at his word, without ever having said anything at all. 
Returning now to our worries about the meaningfulness of talk about being and nothing, it is crucial 
to see that Wittgenstein’s attitude towards metaphysical statements differs from Carnap’s in allowing that 
there are things we cannot say when we attempt to talk about the conditions of meaning, things that ‘make 
themselves manifest.’ Two propositions before his statement that his propositions are nonsensical, 
Wittgenstein tells that “There are, indeed, things that cannot be put into words. They make themselves 
manifest. They are what is mystical.”58 
Wittgenstein’s talk of the ‘manifestation’ of what is inexpressible exhibits striking parallels to 
Heidegger’s talk of the disclosure of ‘beings as a whole’ by our attunements. Wittgenstein agrees with 
Heidegger that the manifestation of the grounds of meaning is an awareness of ‘beings as a whole’ that is 
achieved through a kind of feeling, what Heidegger would have called an attunement: “To view the world 
sub specie aeterni is to view it as a whole—a limited whole. Feeling the world as a limited whole—it is this 
that is mystical.”59 As in Heidegger’s description of anxiety, Wittgenstein’s ‘mystical feeling’ is connected 
to our recognition that there is something rather than nothing: “Not how the world is, is the mystical, but 
that it is.”60 Compare this with Heidegger: “Of all beings, only the human being […] experiences the wonder 
of all wonders: that beings are.”61 For his part, Wittgenstein, himself, seems to have recognized these 
similarities: 
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To be sure, I can imagine what Heidegger means by being and anxiety. Man feels the urge 
to run up against the limits of language. Think for example of the astonishment that 
anything at all exists. This astonishment cannot be expressed in the form of a question, and 
there is also no answer whatsoever. Anything we might say is a priori bound to be mere 
nonsense. Nevertheless we do run up against the limits of language. […W]e are always 
making the attempt to say something that cannot be said, something that does not and never 
will touch the essence of the matter. […] But the inclination, the running up against 
something, indicates something. 62 
 
Nevertheless, despite deep similarities in Wittgenstein and Heidegger’s accounts of how our openness to 
‘beings as a whole’ can be disclosed to us, Wittgenstein differs from Heidegger in maintaining that the 
language we use in trying to express the nature of this openness is meaningless. Wittgenstein writes that 
“this is how it is: if only you do not try to utter what is unutterable then nothing gets lost. But the unutterable 
will be unutterably – contained in what has been uttered!”63 In saying what can be said about how things 
are, the mystical is already contained in what we succeed in saying. It shows itself, and as Wittgenstein puts 
it in the Tractatus, “What can be shown, cannot be said.”64 
But if this proposition, which concerns the limits of sense, is itself nonsense, can we really take 
Wittgenstein at his word when he says that there is something that exceeds the bounds of what we can say? 
I think that we can; as A. W. Moore points out, Wittgenstein says at proposition 6.54 that we understand 
him when we see that his propositions are nonsensical. It is the person that we understand, and not the 
proposition. Moreover, Moore adds, “although Wittgenstein speaks of propositions as both saying and 
showing certain things, he also suggests that the real contrast is between what we (language-users) say by 
means of propositions and what shows itself, or makes itself manifest.”65 We understand Wittgenstein, not 
his propositions, and we understand him when we see what shows or manifests itself. It is in trying to state 
what this is – in trying to state what shows or manifests itself – that we begin to speak nonsensically. We 
can succeed in making ourselves understood through speaking nonsense, but this is not for a hearer to 
understand a proposition, but for them to see something that the speaker also sees, something that makes 
itself manifest. As Moore puts it,  
The understanding that Wittgenstein imparts is a practical understanding. […] The 
Tractatus helps us to make sense of propositional sense. But the sense that it helps us to 
make of propositional sense is not itself propositional. The understanding that Wittgenstein 
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imparts has to be expressed, not in words, but in good philosophy, where good philosophy, 
recall, is an activity, not a body of doctrine […]. 66 
 
Just as for Kant the wit needed to apply a rule properly cannot be stated as a rule, an understanding of what 
can only be shown cannot be stated in a proposition, and so, as Wittgenstein himself puts it, in a note from 
1931, “Work on philosophy [...] is really more work on oneself. On one’s own conception. On how one 
sees things. (And what one expects of them.)”67 
In the end, Wittgenstein’s assessment of metaphysical statements is more ambivalent than 
Carnap’s. Where Carnap mocks Heidegger for expressing his feelings in the form of a theory, Wittgenstein 
recognizes the direction of Heidegger’s thought, and concludes, simply, that what Heidegger wants to 
express is inexpressible. In his “Lecture on Ethics”, Wittgenstein frames the point in terms of ethics and 
religion: both are deeply important to human life, and both are concerned with matters that are, on his view, 
completely inexpressible. After considering whether ethical and religious statements express truths about 
the world, Wittgenstein says, 
I see now that these nonsensical expressions were not nonsensical because I had not yet 
found the correct expressions, but that their nonsensicality was their very essence. For all 
I wanted to do with them was just to go beyond the world and that is to say beyond 
significant language. My whole tendency and I believe the tendency of all men who ever 
tried to write or talk Ethics or Religion was to run against the boundaries of language. This 
running against the walls of our cage is perfectly, absolutely hopeless. Ethics so far as it 
springs from the desire to say something about the ultimate meaning of life, the absolute 
good, the absolute valuable, can be no science. What it says does not add to our knowledge 
in any sense. But it is a document of a tendency in the human mind which I personally 
cannot help respecting deeply and I would not for my life ridicule it.68 
 
There is a there there; it is just that language is not capable of saying so. In his talk of ‘the mystical’ 
Wittgenstein acknowledges that something is revealed in ‘mystical feeling’, a something which plays a 
similar role to Heideggerian attunements in giving us our sense of the world as a whole, a something whose 
role cannot be directly expressed in propositions, but only shown in our grasp of sense as sense and 
nonsense as nonsense. 
 
5. Art, authenticity, and the limits of expression 
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In a letter to the publisher of the Tractatus, Wittgenstein underscores the importance of what the Tractatus 
leaves unsaid: 
the book’s point is an ethical one. I once meant to include in the preface a sentence which 
is not in fact there now… What I meant to write, then, was this: My work consists of two 
parts: the one presented here plus all that I have not written. And it is precisely this second 
part that is the important one.69 
 
Wittgenstein continues, 
My book draws limits to the sphere of the ethical from the inside as it were, and I am 
convinced that this is the ONLY rigorous way of drawing those limits. In short, I believe 
that where many others today are just gassing, I have managed in my book to put everything 
firmly into place by being silent about it.70 
 
But can we ‘put everything firmly into place’ once and for all? If philosophical work is work on oneself 
and how one sees things, if it involves the development of wit and a philosophical equivalent to artistic 
imagination, then is the accomplishment of this work compatible with silence? In what follows, I will argue 
that the attempt to say the unsayable is of great existential significance. Maintaining a clear view of what 
manifests itself is always a struggle, and because of this, silence risks a dereliction of responsibility for how 
one sees things. To pass over the unsayable in silence exposes us to a kind of existential witlessness in the 
form of inauthenticity or ‘bad faith’. 
This can be seen in the very fact that we can think we are talking sense when we are not. Heidegger 
suggests that a key part of the explanation for this is our inescapable tendency towards ‘idle talk’ (Gerede) 
which is built into our capacity for ‘discourse’ (Rede). Discourse is the fundamental determination of our 
way of being that makes it possible for there to be meaning at all. It is because discourse is always threatened 
by the possibility of degeneration into idle talk that I can always raise the question: am I really making 
sense, or am I just mouthing the words? In idle talk, we speak ‘as one ought to’, ‘as they speak’, but in an 
important sense, we do not really mean what we say because we do not really know what we are talking 
about. As Heidegger puts it, “Idle talk is the possibility of understanding everything without any previous 
appropriation of the matter.”71 It is the possibility of understanding things, of projecting your own 
possibilities for being, without grounding that understanding in a firsthand, immediate encounter with those 
things which makes that understanding ‘your own’. 
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Where does the tendency towards idle talk come from? According to Heidegger, as historical beings 
we inherit a background framework of understanding and interpretation that typically dominates our 
encounters with beings. Heidegger calls this inheritance ‘the one’ or ‘the they’ (das Man), because in being 
ourselves we are always tacitly defining our possibilities for being through an ‘average everyday’ sense of 
‘how one acts’ in various situations, and ‘how they speak’ about things. This is not entirely pernicious, 
since it is part of what enables us to get along in daily life. A concern about authenticity begins to creep in, 
however, because in idle talk we ‘understand’ what we are saying, and others ‘understand’ us, only in the 
sense that we understand the words, and what they mean, just as someone lacking in wit ‘knows the rules’ 
but not how to properly apply them. In idle talk, we do not actually succeed in understanding ‘the beings 
talked about’, because the beings themselves are not the source of our understanding; what is understood 
is, instead, the ‘average everydayness’ codified in the medium of communication.72 The existential problem 
facing all of us in using language is that  
This interpretedness of idle talk has always already settled itself down in Dasein. We get 
to know many things initially in this way, and some things never get beyond such an 
average understanding. […] All genuine understanding, interpreting and communication, 
rediscovery and new appropriation come about in it, out of it, and against it. It is not the 
case that a Dasein, untouched and unseduced by this way of interpreting. […] just looks at 
what it encounters. The domination of the public way in which things have been interpreted 
has already decided upon even the possibilities of being attuned, that is, about the basic 
way in which Dasein lets itself be affected by the world. The they prescribes that 
attunement, it determines what and how one “sees.”73 
 
This means that we need to be constantly on guard, ready to renew, refresh, and make authentic our 
understanding of the things we talk about, our way of speaking about them, and how we see them. Just as 
for Kant, a non-discursive talent, wit, is needed in order to apply rules correctly, for Heidegger, the ability 
to genuinely mean what we say rests on a capacity for authentic understanding that is constituted by a non-
discursive grasp of the beings one is speaking about. 
Wittgenstein thinks that the language of the Tractatus must be nonsense because to make sense of 
ourselves making sense in language or thought, we should have to view ourselves from ‘sideways on’,74 
and see our sense-making perspective on things – what Wittgenstein calls the “metaphysical subject”75 – as 
one more thinkable object in the field of what is thinkable, like an eye that impossibly contains itself in its 
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own visual field, as in the diagram at proposition 5.6331. But catching ourselves from sideways on is not a 
requirement for a Heideggerian authenticity-check by way of the phenomenological method. Heidegger’s 
method is to start from within an ordinary life, and to use ordinary words in non-ordinary ways in order to 
allow the subject matter to manifest itself. Take for example, this discussion from Being and Time where 
Heidegger seems to deny the obvious fact that a chair can touch a wall: 
[W]e are accustomed to express linguistically the being together of two objectively present 
things in such a manner: […] “the chair ‘touches’ the wall.” Strictly speaking, we can never 
talk about “touching,” […] because in principle the chair can never touch the wall […]. 
The presupposition for this would be that the wall could be encountered “by” the chair. A 
being can only touch an objectively present being within the world if it fundamentally has 
the kind of being of being-in – only if with its Dasein something like world is already 
discovered in terms of which beings can reveal themselves through touch and thus become 
accessible in their being present.76 
 
This atypical use of words lets us step back a bit from what they say, unsettling our understanding of what 
words like ‘touching’ mean, and allowing us to assess, not from sideways on, but from inside, whether what 
we are saying makes sense, and, more importantly, how. Heidegger’s odd way of expressing himself here 
casts an ordinary word like ‘touching’ in a strange light, bringing out submerged features of its context 
within our lives. This allows us to ask questions about how the word is functioning: whether it is doing 
what we think it is doing, and how it is doing it. This can, in turn, bring to our attention structures and 
relations that are not themselves an ordinary topic of our speech, e.g., certain aspects of what we are like as 
beings that touch, and thereby encounter objects which become present to us. The fact that we encounter 
objects in this way when we touch them while chairs and walls do not is not immediately obvious in our 
ordinary use of the verb ‘to touch’ – indeed, that difference is typically covered over in the way we are 
‘accustomed’ to talk about touching. Heidegger’s use of language here forces us to appropriate the 
phenomenon of ‘touch’; to make it our own by letting it show itself such that we can assess whether this 
part of Heidegger’s account is correct. 
Heidegger’s response, then, to the metacritical question about the possibility of this kind of 
philosophizing is that it is evidently possible, directed as it is towards intersubjectively accessible features 
of ourselves and the world we live in – but it is not possible as a science. Instead, phenomenological 
 
Suarez – “Art, Authenticity, and Understanding” (DRAFT 21-Aug-3) – 20 
philosophy will look more like art, working towards better, more adequate expressions and interpretations 
of the being of various beings without ever finally exhausting the matter at hand. For Heidegger, this is a 
hermeneutic exercise, an exercise in the interpretation of various ways of being, which generates an 
articulated understanding of ourselves as being some way. Crucially, this is not a science; rather, it is a 
mode of self-understanding that places things in a wider context than that provided by any science, because, 
as we have seen, it is our being-in-the-world that provides context for our encounters with beings, and even 
the encounter with ‘beings as a whole’ that is the theme of metaphysics.  
As Heidegger and others have noted, poetry can achieve similarly revelatory effects.77 As in 
Heidegger’s discussion of ‘touch’, when poets hazard unconventional ways of speaking they can articulate 
and uncover aspects of our lives that it would be hard, if not impossible, to express in other terms. One of 
the more optimistic, progressive statements of this thought comes from Audre Lorde, in her short essay, 
“Poetry is not a Luxury,” which I quote here at length: 
For women, then, poetry is not a luxury. It is a vital necessity of our existence. It forms the 
quality of the light within which we predicate our hopes and dreams toward survival and 
change, first made into language, then idea, then into more tangible action. Poetry is the 
way we help give name to the nameless so it can be thought. The farthest horizons of our 
hopes and fears are cobbled by our poems, carved from the rock experiences of our daily 
lives. 
As they become known to and accepted by us, our feelings and the honest 
exploration of them become sanctuaries and spawning grounds for the most radical and 
daring of ideas. They become a safe-house for that difference so necessary to change and 
the conceptualization of any meaningful action. Right now, I could name at least ten ideas 
I would have found intolerable or incomprehensible and frightening, except as they came 
after dreams and poems. This is not idle fantasy, but a disciplined attention to the true 
meaning of ‘it feels right to me.’ We can train ourselves to respect our feelings and to 
transpose them into a language so they can be shared. And where that language does not 
yet exist, it is our poetry which helps to fashion it. Poetry is not only dream and vision; it 
is the skeleton architecture of our lives. […] 
The white fathers told us: I think, therefore I am. The Black mother within each of 
us – the poet – whispers in our dreams: I feel, therefore I can be free. Poetry coins the 
language to express and charter this revolutionary demand, the implementation of that 
freedom.78 
 
There are several things I want to note here. First, even if the value of poetry is greater for oppressed 
and marginalized people, I hope that I am not being too presumptuous in thinking that what Lorde says 
about the value of poetry applies to people in all situations. Second, while one could read Lorde’s talk of 
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‘transposing our feelings into language’ in Carnapian terms as the mere expression of feeling, it is clear 
that she intends something of existential import: poetry can be a way of expressing – of letting be seen – 
ways of being-in-the-world through attunement, understanding, and interpretation, in Heidegger’s sense. It 
is not simply the words themselves, but the activity that reading them engenders in us that is crucial to 
poetry’s capacity to mean what it does, to its capacity to extend and expand our ability to make and discover 
meanings for ourselves, and to inhabit the space of meaning authentically. 
To be the kinds of beings that we are is to be ‘thrown’, to be born and raised in a tradition of pre-
existing meanings to which we are always related in our understanding of our possibilities for being, and 
to be what Charles Taylor called a ‘self-interpreting animal.’79 For Heidegger, the disconcerting effects of 
poetry, and the uncanniness of our being in anxiety, provide vital support in the effort to prevent ourselves 
from interpreting ourselves in ways that are not fully our own. This is a constant battle, because our capacity 
for authentic self-understanding is essentially also a capacity for an inauthentic self-understanding. In 
determining ourselves, in pressing into possibilities for being, we all too often determine ourselves 
according to forms of life for which we do not take responsibility. We evade our responsibility by deluding 
ourselves about our options, ‘fleeing’ as Heidegger says, from responsibility for our being, telling ourselves 
that ‘this is how things are’ and that ‘this is how I am’. Our situation, as Inwood puts it, is this: 
Human beings are usually involved in dealings with entities in their environment. They 
have, however, the capacity to transcend their customary environment, to take stock of 
their lives, and to decide how they are to be, in disregard of the idols before which they 
normally cringe. This capacity enables us to engage with beings in the way we do, not 
benumbed by them as insects are, but regarding them as beings. But we need on occasion 
to exercise this capacity explicitly if we are not to descend too far into intraworldly beings 
and become too insect-like. The normal human condition is suspended somewhere between 
the Angst-less insect and the Angst-ridden angel.80 
 
 This lack of finality is crucial to our decision about whether we ought to remain silent about the 
fundamental conditions of our meaning-making. The early Wittgenstein thinks that having written the 
Tractatus he (and the rest of us) ought now to remain silent because there will never be anything more 
which needs to be shown than what the Tractatus has already shown. As we have seen, however, there is 
reason to think that this is not the case. Inauthenticity always threatens us in our being, linguistic and 
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otherwise. The ways of getting lost are various, and so must be the remedies. Wittgenstein, himself, seems 
to have seen this, and the Philosophical Investigations provide a wonderful example of what it might mean 
to work on one’s way of seeing through non-discursive means, and the same goes for, Heidegger’s talk of 
the nothing, Lorde’s talk of the liberatory possibilities provided by poetry, and Kant and Fichte’s talk of 
the genius of the artist and the philosopher. Seeing the nothing does not result in knowledge of any facts, 
nor in any specific imperatives, but to lose sight of it, is, in some important sense, to lose your way. It serves 
then, not as a contribution to science or normative ethics, but as a call to authenticity, providing us with a 
form of self-understanding that allows us to resist the idea that something in the bowels of the real tells us, 
definitively, how to be or what to do. 
The activity of writing and reading about the nothing, and, what is not altogether dissimilar, of 
writing and reading poetry, can enhance our capacities for self-determination, and in this way, it works 
towards the same end as Kantian critique. The activity recommended by Heidegger, however, is one that 
cannot be completed — it does not and is not meant to issue in a critical system; it is what Heidegger in his 
later work calls, simply, ‘thinking’. This has the effect of shifting the terrain of the debate about whether 
and how we are making sense in these activities from the merely semantic to the existential. And here, we 
can ask: is it better to side with Wittgenstein and remain silent; or is it better to side with Carnap and take 
an engineer’s stance to language; or is it better to side with Lorde and Heidegger in appreciating puzzling 
uses of language insofar as they can be genuinely revelatory? Carnap and Wittgenstein cede the grounds of 
intelligibility to choice on the one hand, and to silence on the other, but I think this is the wrong response. 
This ground may be dark, and resistant to clarifying light of science, but to jettison the attempt to say the 
unsayable in philosophy is to run the risk of allowing ourselves to philosophize in bad faith – of being, and 
remaining existentially witless. 
Wittgenstein himself says, “I believe I summed up where I stand in relation to philosophy when I 
said: philosophy really only allows one to poetize [Philosophie dürfte man eigentlich nur dichten]” adding, 
however, “I was acknowledging myself, with these words, to be someone who cannot quite do what he 
would like to be able to do.”81 But can’t one succeed in working on oneself – succeed in working on how 
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